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1Abstract
I combine two previously separate strands of the bargaining literature to present a bar-
gaining model with both one-sided private information and a majority vote for proposals
to go into effect. I use this model to show that the US bankruptcy code produces shorter
delays and higher welfare than the UK law.
I consider the bargaining that occurs in bankruptcy between an informed ﬁrm and a set
of uninformed creditors over a set of claims against the ﬁrm. The agents have an inﬁnite
horizon to bargain and cannot commit to a schedule of future offers. If individual creditors
can be treated differently and a majority vote is required for the acceptance of new claims,
adding creditors increases the probability of reaching agreement by the end of any given
period. The US regime has these features. I give numerical examples which show the
efﬁciency gains from increasing the number of creditors are signiﬁcant.
The UK voting rule allows one creditor a veto of all plans. Replacing the majority
voting rule with the UK voting rule and allowing only the creditor with the veto to suggest
plans, I show that the UK regime has longer delays and is less efﬁcient than the US regime
as long as the US regime has multiple creditors.
1 Introduction
In this paper, I consider the process of debt renegotiation between a ﬁrm and its creditors in
bankruptcy. The management and the creditors bargain over new claims that the ﬁrm pays.
The current management has private information on its ability to run the ﬁrm, which affects
bargaining. I show that the nature of the bankruptcy law can have large effects on the size of
the inefﬁciencies in bargaining.
I compare bargaining outcomes with two different bankruptcy laws. Under the ﬁrst law,
a ﬁrm can leave bankruptcy if a set of new claims, or a plan, passes a majority vote among
the creditors and is approved by the ﬁrm. I label this law the “majority vote” law. Under the
second law, one speciﬁc creditor is deemed to have a special priority which gives him the right
to propose new contracts to the ﬁrm. The ﬁrm must in turn approve the plan. No other creditor
needs to approve the plan. I refer to this law as the “controlling creditor” law.
There are two main results. The ﬁrst is a comparison of delays in bankruptcy for the two
systems. With just one creditor these two laws are identical in every detail and produce the
same delays. With multiple creditors, however, the delays in bankruptcy are shorter under the
majority vote law. With such a law, as more creditors are added the bargaining becomes faster.
The majority vote law introduces a beneﬁt from joining the ”winning coalition.” More creditors
increases the relative beneﬁt which leads creditors to offer the ﬁrm a higher probability of
settlement.
The second main result is a welfare comparison. For such a comparison, I allow the ﬁrm
to negotiate its initial contracts. The ﬁrm does not know its ability to run the ﬁrm until after
it makes the investment. After it makes the investment, the ﬁrm’s management learns its man-
2agerial ability and receives its proﬁts. If the ﬁrm can afford the payments it has negotiated, it
makes them to the creditors. Otherwise the ﬁrm enters bankruptcy. There are the same The
majority vote law maximizes ex-ante welfare in this environment. There is a hold up prob-
lem here. The tough bargaining positions of the controlling creditor lead to more delays than
greater revenues.
Speed in a bankruptcy law can be beneﬁcial to the welfare derived from the institution of
bankruptcy. A fast bankruptcy law makes debt ﬁnance more attractive. Potential managers
and lenders can be unwilling to sign debt contracts if they believe that poor outcomes lead
the ﬁrm to languish in the limbo of the bankruptcy court. A long stay in bankruptcy can bind
key assets of the ﬁrm in unproductive uses and make long term relationships with clients and
suppliers hard to establish and maintain. Similarly, potential lenders may be scared off by
long bankruptcies. A prolonged bankruptcy can bind the lenders’ collateral, create liquidity
shortages, and generally introduce uncertainty. In practice, slow reorganization laws can lead
the participants to liquidate otherwise viable ﬁrms.
I would also like to highlight a normative aspect of this result. One controversy in the study
of bankruptcy is the degree in which the US bankruptcy law allows ”winning coalitions” to
form. This paper implicitly makes a normative argument for encouraging such coalitions.
The body of this paper is as follows. In the next section, I discuss the legal counterparts of
these two laws, the US and UK bankruptcy laws. In Section 3, I discuss the related literature.
In Section 4, I deﬁne the ex-post game focusing on the model with the majority vote law. I
describe the equilibrium and present an existence and uniqueness result. In Section 5, I give
the delay comparison. In Section 6, I perform the welfare comparison. Section 7 concludes.
2 Description of US and UK Bankruptcy Laws
I study the majority vote and controlling creditor laws because they capture distinguishing
features of the US and the UK bankruptcy laws.1 A majority (or, to be precise, a weighted
supermajority less than unanimity) vote among the creditors plays a key role in the passage of
plans under the US law, or Chapter 11. In addition, the inferior treatment of a particular group
of creditors is not sufﬁcient to prevent a plan from going into effect.
To defend these claims, it is useful to describe the typical negotiations under Chapter 112.
Consider a ﬁrm whose debt is held entirely by unsecured creditors. First the ﬁrm negotiates
the plan with a subset of the creditors who approve it by a majority vote. Once the Creditors’
Committee and the court approve the plan, the ﬁrm puts the plan to a vote among the entire
set of creditors through a fairly elaborate rule (Either a majority within every class or through
cramdown). In general, an afﬁrmative vote from the creditors that is less than unanimous is
1In the Legal Appendix, I give a more detailed description of the laws. I also document the details that are
presented here. This is available on request and on the authors website.
2Alternatively, one can read ? for a full discussion on allowable discrimination in bankruptcy
3required.
Next, suppose an arbitrary unsecured creditor is treated less favorably than his counterparts
in a plan that has passed the above votes. To keep the plan from going into effect, the inferiorly
treated creditor must contest the plan at a “cramdown” hearing. In a cramdown hearing, the
creditor may be able block the plan by convincing the judge that he has been treated in an
inferior manner to creditors he shares priority with. However, there are many reasons the
creditor may not do this. First the court can rule that there is a principled basis for the unequal
treatment.3 Plus the discrimination may be hard for a judge to determine, especially if it takes
the form of an unobservable payment. If no creditor draws out a cramdown hearing, the judge
makes a determination whether the plan is in the ﬁrm’s and the creditors’ best interests and if
so accepts the plan.
ThecontrollingcreditorlawcapturesauniquefeatureoftheUKlaw, orReceivership. Inthe
UK, a necessary requirement for a ﬁrm to exit bankruptcy is that one speciﬁc, predetermined
creditor supports the plan. This creditor has the powers the controlling creditor has in the
model.
Since the model maps into the US and UK laws, comparing the potential inefﬁciencies in
the data for these countries is informative. There are signiﬁcant differences in the data. The
delays in the reorganization of ﬁnancial distressed ﬁrms in the US are typically much shorter.
The mean of (UK) ﬁrms that successfully reorganize in receivership is 52 months as opposed
to 21 months for ﬁrm in Chapter 11 (US).4
3 Related Literature
Other authors have attempted to categorize the effect of different sized sets of debtholders on
outcomes of renegotiations. Such papers include, Gertner and Scharfstein (1991) and Bolton
and Scharfstein (1996) where they tend to ﬁnd multiple creditors makes debt more difﬁcult to
renegotiate. However they do not consider an environment where binding offers can be made
to the entire set of creditors. Doing so changes the results and is important to the study of
bankruptcy.
Noristhistheﬁrstpaperthatuseabargainingframeworktomodelbankruptcy. Suchpapers
include Hart and Moore (1994), Eraslan (2002), and Bebchuk and Chang (1992). They usually
assume complete information and study different extensive forms than the one here.
The theoretical analysis builds on two canonical bargaining models. In order to talk to
delays in bargaining between an informed ﬁrm and multiple uninformed creditors, I combine
the Gul, Sonnenschein, and Wilson (1986) and Fudenburg, Levine, and Tirole (1985) model
3A frequent rationale for such a determination is that the extra-favorable treatment for another creditor occurs
because such treatment is a ”business necessity,” or that a good relationship with the favored creditor is important
for the continuation of the ﬁrm. A second rationale is that the discrimination is not signiﬁcant enough to stop an
otherwise acceptable plan.
4The data is presented and discussed in the Appendix. Measurement issues are discussed there.
4of bargaining among two agents with one-sided incomplete information with the Baron and
Ferejohn (1989) model of bargaining where identically informed agents must approve plans
through a majority vote.
4 The Ex-Post Game
I consider a ﬁrm entering bankruptcy with outstanding debts to a set of n identical creditors.
If n > 1, I describe only bargaining with the US regime. For ﬁrms bargaining with the UK
regime, I assume n = 1. (Other agents do not participate.)
There exists one ﬁrm with type θ ∈ [θl,θh]. The ﬁrm’s type, θ, is the present discounted
value for the ﬁrm with its current management. It is only achievable for a ﬁrm outside bank-
ruptcy and is private information to the ﬁrm, which is perfectly informed. The return to the
ﬁrm if it is run by an outsider is θl. Thus θ − θl is the return to the ﬁrm’s management abil-
ity. Firms inside bankruptcy have no returns. This captures both the negative effects ﬁnancial
distress and judicial oversight has with the management’s ability to run the ﬁrm as it sees best.
The creditors share an initial belief that θ has density f and distribution F. The upper bound
on the distribution of θ is θh. The density is sufﬁciently smooth.
There are an odd number of uninformed creditors, n, with identical claims. All agents are
risk neutral and have a common discount factor δ.
At the beginning of period 1, one creditor is chosen at random to propose a plan consisting
of a set of payments to the n creditors. This creditor is called the proposer.
All other creditors are called voters. After a plan is made the creditors and then the ﬁrm
vote on the plan. If the ﬁrm and a majority of the creditors (n−1
2 of the voters) accept the plan,
it goes into effect immediately. If not the game goes on to the next period, where it repeats.
The game concludes when a plan is passed.
Proposers’ strategies are a map from the relevant history to the plans or n payments;
pit (to himself) and {pjt}j6=i (to other creditors)5
Theremainingcreditors, or”voters”simplyvote. Theﬁrm’sstrategyisanacceptance/rejection
decision.
The payoff to the ﬁrm is the discounted value of the ﬁrm’s proﬁts minus any payments the
ﬁrm make, δt(θ −
P
pk)
For the creditors, there are two payoffs to track, a proposer’s payoff, V and a voter’s payoff,
W. where the argument captures the upper bound on the agents’ common belief.
The equilibrium concept is Weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.6 Beliefs are shared. They
5Currently there is no restriction on plans that the proposer can suggest. I have extended the results in this
paper to a model in which the minimum payment is ﬁxed relative to the aggregate payment. This generalization
is in the Technical Appendix, which is available from the author on request.
6A well known result is that for this class of models Weak Perfect Bayesian and Sequential Equilibria are
equivalent.
5update as is standard in bargaining games. In all equilibria, in each period, those with types
above a given threshold accept the creditors’ offer. All others reject. Hence, each successive
belief is a truncation of previous beliefs to an interval containing θl.
I contend that there is a natural equilibrium outcome to study7. The proposer offers the
largest payment to himself. He offers a smaller payment to a subset of creditors which form a
minimum coalition. All other creditors are offered a zero payment.8.
The equilibrium can be described through a functional equation, in which the creditors’
payoffs depend on the belief θb entering a given period. Letting Θ equal the set of all types,
then the functional equation is presented through the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Consider the following set of functions: Θ → R, a payment to the proposer p1;
payment to the included voters p−1; a belief updating function, g ; value functions, V,W; and
an aggregate payment function, C = p1 + n−1
2 p−1;




For each θb, a proposer with an upper bound on beliefs of θb chooses θa,pi, and pj to satisfy
DP
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pj ≥ δ (θa − C(θa)) (2)



























7In the BF model, there are a large multiplicity of equilibria. It is possible to generalize the reﬁnement there
to produce a unique equilibrium for some parameter values, however there is a good deal of arbitrariness in such
extensions.
8This is the minimum allowed payment.
6θl ≤ θa ≤ θb (4)
II. And given pi,pj,θa and V from DP the following relationships complete a ﬁxed point argument:
p1(θb) = pi (5)
p−1(θb) = pj (6)
























The proof of this proposition is in the Appendix. Only a few of the above objects warrant a
description.
(1) is the objective function of the proposer. In the next period, if he proposes again, he
receives V . If not then he is offered the voter’s payment, W.
(2) constrains the proposer such that his suggestion of lowest type to approve the plan is
the lowest type that incentives dictate approve the plan. The incentive constraints of all other
types of the ﬁrm do not bind.
(3) constrains the proposer to only suggest plans such that creditors for whom a ’Y’ is
needed for plans to pass vote as required.
(5) to (8) are primarily notational as they ensure that V and W correspond to actual equi-
librium outcomes.
From here some manipulation is possible that highlights the role increasing creditors plays







solution to our problem is the same as the solution to a standard problem given the proposer
makes offers with a discount factor was ¯ delta.
The main results rely on the quasi-discount factor decreasing in n. Hence, the results would
be essentially the same if a supermajority short of unanimity is needed.9 With unanimity, the
results are different. For unanimity, regardless of n, the quasi-discount factor equals the actual
discount factor and changing the number of creditors does not affect outcomes.
9This is very important to the application where due to the complicated acceptance rule and judicial discretion,
a better approximation of the US rule may be a supermajority rule greater than majority but short of unanimity.
74.1 Intermediate Results
I generalize two results from the incomplete information bargaining literature in this section.
Both pertain to equilibria that satisfy the Functional Equation. I show that if θl > 0, should
an equilibria exist, the bargaining ends in a ﬁnite number of periods almost surely. I call this
the Finite Ending Result. Using this result I present an existence and uniqueness theorem for
equilibrium that satisfy the Functional Equation.
Proposition 2. Finite Ending Result If θl > 0, in any equilibrium that satisﬁes the Functional
Equation, the bargaining lasts a ﬁnite number of periods.
The proof of the Finite Ending Result is a generalization of FLT.10 The result implies that
if an equilibrium exists the bargaining must last a ﬁnite number of periods. Hence to show
existence, I can consider only equilibrium candidates that must eventually produce agreement
for sure. The equilibrium strategies must contain a plan that the lowest type θl accepts for sure.
I can show such a plan exists and is part of an optimal strategy. From this plan I can con-
struct the continuation payoffs for games in the second to last period of bargaining. Working
inductively, I can prove both existence and uniqueness by calculating the unique equilibrium
outcome in a given period when the expected continuation payoffs are derived from know
equilibrium behavior. This result is useful, because it provides a characterization of equilib-
rium outcomes with small lower bounds on beliefs. When equilibrium outcomes have explicit
characterizations, then the desired comparative static results are easy to show.
Theorem 1. Let θl > 0. There exists a unique equilibrium outcome which satisﬁes the (Sim-
pler) Functional Equation generically up to a potential multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes in
the initial period over a set of measure zero.11
The proof of this theorem is in the Appendix and again is a generalization of FLT and
Ausubel and Deneckere (1989). A byproduct of the proof is a recursive description of the
Equilibrium. There is the matter of existence if θl = 0. In this case I restrict the distribution to
be of simple functional forms for all the results I derive. I prove existence by constructing the
solution to the functional equation.
5 Delay Comparisons
In this section, I present the main result, the delay comparison which shows a primary differ-
ence between the two laws. The main result is that, as n increases, the lowest type accepting
the creditors’ offer falls in every period and agreements are quicker. This result requires some
10Due to the length and lack of original contribution, it is available on request
11In period 1, the initial proposer may have more than one optimal choice of P and θa. But after this period,
the equilibrium is entirely without mixed strategies. The generic restriction is that such a multiplicity of outcomes
can occur at most on a countable subset of initial beliefs.
8qualiﬁcation since even for the standard GSW and FLT models, the belief updating function,
g, may not necessarily be monotone increasing in δ12 For this particular model, I am concerned
about situations in which g is increasing in ¯ δ for a ﬁxed δ. In this event, I say that the “Impa-
tience Effect” dominates, since in these situations a more impatient proposer engages in less
screening of types. I prove the result for distributions on [0,θh] that are similar to the uniform
distribution. I also provide an example to show the delay comparison holds for a standard gap
case environment.
I prefer to state the theorem given the continuation rate The continuation rate is the proba-
bility the bargaining has not stopped given an initial upper bound on beliefs of θb, n creditors,







The term in the numerator θat is simply the highest type to still bargain at the end of period
t.
Theorem 2. [Delay Comparison] If θl = 0 and θ is uniformly distributed13
then F n
t (θh) < F 1
t (θh) ∀t.
The proof of this proposition is in the appendix.
The quantitative effects of increasing the number of creditors with this highly ﬁctionalized
bankruptcy law can be seen through a numerical example. In Figure 5-5c, I normalize θh to
1, and let n = 1 and 9. The number of creditors is chosen to match US and UK observations.
The ﬁrst observation, n = 1, is chosen to capture the equivalence between the UK law and
the US law with one creditor. The second observation, n = 9, is chosen to match the average
number of classes of impaired debt for a ﬁrm in bankruptcy in the US as found by LoPucki and
Whitford (1990).
Ireporttheexpecteddelaysinnumberofperiodsassociatedwithintroducingmorecreditors
in Figure 5b as the discount factor varies or the cost of delay decreases. (One may think that
calendar time affects bankruptcy renegotiations so that short time periods between offers are
improbable.) As this ﬁgure shows, the expected delays in the one creditor model can be many
multiples of the expected delays in the multiple creditor model which would be predictable
because the quasi-discount factor diverges strongly from the actual discount factor for any n as
β converges to one.
5.1 Delay Comparison: Gap Case
In the ”Gap” case the forward looking nature of beliefs implies that the payment function C is
not differentiable. This is not a problem if there are two or few periods of bargaining. But for
12To the author’s knowledge no necessary and sufﬁcient condition exists for such a model.
13or polynomially distributed with the density cxn
9most distributions, this can be a huge barrier to analytic results with as little as three periods
of bargaining. I use examples to demonstrate a common but slightly weaker outcome, the
expected length of bargaining decreases in n.
I highlight one example with a uniform distribution. To I pick θl = 0.1,θh = 1.1, N = 9
and δ = 0.97 for the example I show. The output shown is the expected length of bargaining.
As the graph shows, decreasing patience can have a strong effect. Among other distributions,
the normal produces similar distributions.
However sufﬁcient conditions for more general analytic theorems are difﬁcult to show. In
particular, global comparative statics on the belief updating function are rare. In the ”Gap” case
the forward looking nature of beliefs implies that the payment function C is not differentiable
and that the belief updating function, g can have jumps if the belief is sufﬁciently high.
In the next section, I consider the game before the initial contracts are signed which, should
the ﬁrm default, lead to the ex-post model of bankruptcy. For the ex-ante game, there are
two important variables from the ex-post game: X and U. To set notation, X(θh,n) and
U(θh,n,θ) are the expected payoffs to the entire set of creditors and type θ ﬁrm respectively,
if the highest type in bankruptcy is θh and there are n creditors who actively bargain with the
ﬁrm in bankruptcy. I adopt the notational convention that n refers to the number of creditors
who actively participate in the ex post game, not the number of creditors who sign the initial
contracts.
6 Ex-Ante Contracts and Welfare
I conclude the paper with an ex-ante welfare comparison for the two bankruptcy systems. I
consider the problem for a ﬁrm which must sign a contract at t = 0 in order to receive the
necessary ﬁnance to earn θ. I show that welfare is higher with the US system.
The model for this section is simple and is a natural extension of the previous model. De-
fault in this model leads to the ex-post game described in Section 4. New to this model is a
trade-off between avoiding delay costs should bankruptcy occur and obtaining sufﬁcient fund-
ing for projects. I show that the US regime with n creditors is ex-ante superior to the UK
regime if solvent ﬁrms cannot enter bankruptcy.14 This is satisﬁed by the US bankruptcy code
if judges can observe whether a ﬁrm’s type is above a given threshold. I make the assump-
tion because I do not want the payments negotiated by ﬁrms that settle in the ﬁrst period of
bankruptcy to determine the payments ﬁrms make outside bankruptcy.
This section is organized as follows. The ex-ante model is described ﬁrst and welfare
deﬁned. Then, the welfare comparison is presented. (The Delay Comparison continues to hold
trivially.)
14The qualitative result applies to a model in which managers must pay a sufﬁciently large ﬁxed cost (in terms
of their personal reputation for example) to enter bankruptcy. It does not apply to environments where entering
bankruptcy is costless. In this case the qualitative results shift.
106.1 Ex-Ante Environment and Timing
Consider a ﬁrm which can earn a stock return of θ, where θ is restricted to be uniformly
distributed on [0,1]. To achieve θ, the ﬁrm must borrow I to begin the project. At the time the
ﬁrm seeks ﬁnancing in period 0, θ is unknown to the ﬁrm. To obtain ﬁnancing, a ﬁrm signs
a debt contract with an exogenous of the creditors. It has a value of p, which in the US, the
creditors split evenly. In the UK, the payment to the receiver outside bankruptcy must differ
from what the other creditors get. The debt contract gets the ﬁrm I. In the US, the burden
of supplying the investment I is split evenly among the creditors who sign the contract. This
gives me identical creditors in bankruptcy. In the UK, the investment can be divided arbitrarily
between the receiver and the other creditors. The investment market is perfectly competitive
and all creditors have enough resources to meet whatever is demanded of them. The players
are restricted to sign contracts such that all payments outside bankruptcy must be made in the
ﬁrst period.
The ﬁrm’s ex-ante problem has the timing outlined in Figure 2. In period 0, the ﬁrm pro-
poses the initial contract. This is a take-it-or-leave-it offer. The initial contract consists of the
fraction of the required investment from each of the creditors in period zero and the payment
the creditors are entitled to in period 1. If all the creditors approve, the initial contract is signed
and I is delivered. In period 1, the ﬁrm learns its type. If the ﬁrm has sufﬁcient resources, it
makes the aggregate payment, p, and consumes θ − p. If θ is beneath the promised aggregate
payment, the ﬁrm enters bankruptcy. From here the timing is the same as in the ex-post model.
The ﬁrst offer occurs in the period the ﬁrm enters bankruptcy.
The distributionof the ﬁrm’stype beforeany contracts aresigned is called G. Oncethe con-
tracts are signed and the types of the ﬁrm above the bankruptcy threshold make their payments,
the distribution of ﬁrms inside bankruptcy, F, can be found from F(θ) =
G(θ)
G(θh). Associated
with G is a density ga. From here, I consider only welfare with n creditors in both systems. I
call welfare in country C, ZC.








(θ − p)ga(θ)dθ (9)
such that
θh − p ≥ 0 (10)
X(θh,n) + p(1 − G(θh)) = I (11)
Constraint (10) is a wealth constraint which puts ﬁrms that cannot afford the prescribed
payment into bankruptcy. Constraint (11) is a zero expected proﬁt constraint on the entire set
of creditors.
11Welfare in the UK system requires a different deﬁnition as the constraints change. For
ease of exposition, let creditor one be the receiver. This is exogenous to the model. Creditor
one receives p1 outside bankruptcy. All other creditors receive p−1 outside bankruptcy. Inside
bankruptcycreditoroneistheonlycreditornegotiatingwiththeﬁrmandtheonlyonetoreceive
positive payments. The other creditors receive zero payments. Likewise, I1 and I−1 refer to
the expected investment from the receiver and from any other creditor, respectively. With this








(θ − p)ga(θ)dθ (12)
such that
θh − p ≥ 0 (13)
X(θh,1) + p1 (1 − G(θh)) = I1 (14)
p−1 (1 − G(θh)) = I−1 (15)
p1 + (n − 1)p−1 = p (16)
I1 + (n − 1)I−1 = I (17)
There are two zero proﬁt constraints: (14) for creditor one and (15) for the other creditors.
Constraints (16) and (17) are identities that insure that the creditors as a whole receive the
an aggregate payment equal to what the aggregate payment the ﬁrm makes and supply the
aggregate investment the ﬁrm receives. The values of p1,p−1,I1 and I−1 that solve the problem
are indeterminant. The receiver must supply a share of the investment equal to the bankruptcy
payments, but anything else is kosher.
The welfare result is simple. If the investment can be afforded in the US, welfare is higher
there.
Proposition 3. Suppose
I. n > 1
II. δ is sufﬁciently high 15
III. I ≤ maxθh X(θh,n) + θh (1 − G(θh))
then ZUS > ZUK.
The proof is in the Appendix.The result occurs because there is a hold up problem that
reduces ex-ante welfare. For high discount factors, the patience of the ﬁrm implies that more
15Sufﬁciently high=0.54 if n = 9.
12patient proposers generate more deadweight losses than revenues. Multiple creditors sacriﬁce
these small revenues gains but avoid the larger deadweight losses. This eases the hold up
problem.
For the above model, the Delay Comparison continues to hold. This is true simply because
the continuation rate is constant in θh whenever θ has the uniform distribution.
7 Conclusion
From this study, advice can be found for governments choosing bankruptcy laws. On the
simplest level, if the choice is a zero-one choice between the US and the UK bankruptcy laws,
then they should choose the US law.
If the choice is for general principles to govern bankruptcy, the bankruptcy system should
be designed, in part, to prevent inefﬁciencies ex-post. Picking a voting rule that facilitates
agreements, such as a majority voting rule, can signiﬁcantly reduce inefﬁciencies that are the
result of lengthy delays. Conversely, requiring creditors to consent to any write down of their
debt increases ex-post inefﬁciencies and as such is undesirable to a country choosing a bank-
ruptcy law.
However, there is a caveat to the importance of a majority vote. A majority vote is only
effective in limiting delays if individual creditors can be rewarded, relative to other creditors,
for supporting plans that produce agreements. An equally key feature of bankruptcy design
is that the division of claims between creditors must be open to negotiation. This is a much
maligned feature of Chapter 11 but a key part of its success.
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8 Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1
I complete this proof by constructing strategies and beliefs such that the corresponding
outcome given by functional equation is an equilibrium outcome.










zj ∈ {0,1} (19)
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Y if C(θb) ≤ (1 − δ)g(θb) + δC (g(θb)),
N otherwise
µt = the truncation of f to [θl,θb]
I claim that the above is an equilibrium. It is easy to show that the above strategies reproduce
the continuation values in Program 1. It is also apparent that the beliefs satisfy Bayes’ Rule. In
this proof I simply check one period deviations to show the strategies are best responses. First
consider the proposer. First I show that the proposer chooses the optimal division of resources
among the creditors. There are two cases. In the ﬁrst case the proposer makes an offer that
is rejected by all types of the ﬁrm, say Pt = θh + 1. This earns him the continuation value
evaluated at the current upper bound on belief θb regardless of the division in his proposed plan
among the creditors. Hence any equilibrium proﬁle that includes such an aggregate payment
can be a best response whenever making a non-serious offer is a best response. This includes
the proﬁle suggested here.
15Suppose it is a best response to make an offer such that some types of the ﬁrm accept. I
must show that the division described above is optimal. For a particular aggregate payment Pt,
let’s derive the highest payoff the proposer can achieve. Note the continuation payoff for all
voters are identical at Pt given the equilibrium proﬁle (and the restriction on the z’s in (20)).
Hence their continuation values are identical. To receive the necessary votes, the plan must
satisfy (3) with inequality (or else the proposer can achieve the same welfare by making a


























Hence the only possible deviation is one that satisﬁes (3) with strict inequality. But such an
offer is not a best response to the creditors’ strategies, as the proposer could get the requisite
votes and a higher share of the revenues by decreasing the offer to the creditor for whom the
incentive constraint does not bind.
Next consider the proposer’s choice of the aggregate plan P ∗
t = C(θb). Based on the
equilibrium strategies for every possible aggregate plan P ∗
t , there exists a lowest type θa that
accepts the plan. This type is given by (2), but with strict equality.
θa − pi −
(n − 1)
2
pj = δ (θa − C(θa))
It is obvious, in the solution to DP constraint (2) always holds with equality. Hence the
proposer always considers the ﬁrm’s equilibrium strategy when choosing a plan.
The equilibrium strategies give us that the welfare function in (1) corresponds to V , Hence
the proposer in period t maximizes his choice of an aggregate plan by solving the maximization
problem outlined in DP.
For voters and ﬁrms, the strategy proﬁle is a best response if they vote ’Y’ whenever their
currentpayoffishigherthantheircontinuationvalue. Thesearepreciselythestrategiesoutlined
above.
Thus the proposed strategies are an equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition (2)
Proposition. If θl > 0, the bargaining lasts a ﬁnite number of periods.
The proposition can be shown with two lemmas. The ﬁrst shows that if the upper bound
on the belief is sufﬁciently low the game ends in the current period. The second shows such
beliefs are always reached.
16Lemma 1. In any equilibrium there exists a θ∗ > θl, such that if the belief falls below θ∗, the
game ends in one period, regardless of the proposer. Further, the aggregate payment equals θl
in such a period.
Proof of Lemma
First I establish the complete set of strategies for games in their ﬁnal period. This allows
me to explicitly derive the proposer’s payoff for settling with all of the remaining types in a
period.
If after any relevant history for proposer i, ht
i, and upper bound on belief, θ∗, it is common
knowledge the game ends in the current period; then, for the proposer’s value, vo, and a voter’s
expected value, w0, the proposer solves:
Last Period’s Problem





s.t. θl − pi −
(n − 1)
2
















This is the problem studied in Baron and Ferejohn (1989) which they show has a unique
solution:
Deﬁnition 1. The Baron-Ferejohn payments or BF payments for surplus s are such that:
Let BF = 1 − δ n−1
2n .
I. The proposer request BF times s for himself.
II. For half of the remaining creditors he requests
2(1−BF)s
n of the surplus
III. For the other half he requests a payment of zero.
17The equilibrium outcome for any game in the ﬁnal period of bargaining includes dividing
θl according to the BF payments.
Next I show that there exists a θ∗ such that for all beliefs beneath θ∗, all plans with P > θl
are dominated by splitting θl according to the BF payments.
The ﬁrst step in this process is to show that there exists a θ∗ such that the expected payoff
to the entire set of creditors is maximized by offering P = θl.
Claim 1. There exists a θ∗ such that if θb < θ∗, X(θb) is maximized by setting P = θl.
This is the ﬁrst part of Lemma 3 in FLT and is not shown here.
Next, I show that for θ∗ sufﬁciently low, the proposer cannot do better in equilibrium by
any other strategy than he could do by splitting θl according to the Baron Ferejohn payments.
Claim 2. For θb sufﬁciently low, offering P = θl to be divided according to the Baron-Ferejohn
payments is part of any equilibrium strategy.
To prove this claim I show that whenever P = θl maximizes the aggregate payoff (X) to the
creditors, I can always ﬁnd a plan which dominates any plan with aggregate payment P ∗ > θl.
Proof of Claim
Suppose not. Consider a candidate equilibrium plan with aggregate payment P ∗ > θl. This
aggregate payment implies a set of payments {p∗
j}n
j=1 to the individual creditors and a type
θ1 > θl that accepts P ∗. Instead of offering the ﬁrm P ∗ and the creditors {p∗
j}n
j=1, the proposer
receives a higher payoff by giving the ﬁrm a plan with a lower aggregate payment, P = θl, and
the individual creditors a share of P equal to their expected payoff associated with the original
offer and consuming the residual. If the original offer passes the requisite votes, the new offer
also passes the requisite vote and approval/ veto decision. Because of the previous claim, the
proposer prefers the new plan to the original plan.
Next I complete the original proposition with a lemma that the upper bound on belief θ∗ is
reached in ﬁnite time.
Lemma 2. For any initial belief, µ, there exist a period T such that all types have settled in
at most T periods of bargaining. That is within T − 1 periods the upper bound on beliefs has
fallen below θ∗.
The above lemma is demonstrated in Lemma 2 in FLT. Hence the proof is omitted.
The lemma completes the proof of Proposition (2).
Proof of Proposition (??)
For ease of exposition, I assume all relevant functions are differentiable. Consider Program
(1).






P(θa) = (1 − δ)θa + δC(θa)


































+ ν(θa − θl) (26)


























Next consider the problem in Program (2).





P(θa)(F(θb) − F(θa)) + ¯ δ(n,δ)X(θa)

The F.O.C. for an interior optimum for this problem is:
P(θa)(−f(θa)) + P










Hence any solution to Program 2 must satisfy (30).




From here, substituting ξ and λ into (29) yields (30) and the F.O.C.’s that determine g(θb)
for the two models match.
Thus the belief updating functions g are identical at every period if the C and X functions
for the two problems are identical. It is a simple result that identical g functions for different
n’s force the C and X functions to be identical. These relationships imply that any (g,C,X)
associated with a solution to Program 1 is a solution to Program 2.
19Proof of Theorem 1
I prove this theorem by deriving the only possible equilibrium recursively from the last
period of bargaining. I show that in every period the proposer has a well deﬁned maximiza-
tion problem with a unique solution. Subscripts refer to additional periods of bargaining not
including the current period. I conjecture that the game ends in the current period.
The Zero Iteration
From previous work, for all θb, let
g0(θb) = θl (31)
C0(θb) = θl (32)
X0(θb) = θlF(θb) (33)
Note this is the unique outcome to the game given the initial conjecture.
From here I conjecture that all bargaining ends in two periods. Note if the game requires
two periods to end, then in the ﬁnal period, the payment in the ﬁnal period is C0(θb). The
expected revenues to the creditor in the ﬁnal period are X0(θb).
The First Iteration
Given C0, and X0; for all θb, let
g1(θb) = argmax
θa
((1 − δ)θa + δC0(θa))(F(θb) − F(θa)) + ¯ δX0(θa) (34)
C1(θb) = (1 − δ)g1(θb) + δC0 (g1(θb)) (35)
X1(θb) = C1(θb)(F(θb) − F (g1(θb))) + δX0(g1(θb)) (36)
The maximum theorem gives that g1 is a UHC correspondence. An argument in Ausubel
and Deneckere (1989) (Proposition 4.3) gives that g1 is single valued, except possibly in the
initial period over a countable set. Hence C1 and X1 are continuous functions and are uniquely
deﬁned. I note that having completed the ﬁrst iteration, I can place a restriction on the highest
upper bound such that bargaining lasts one additional period.
θ1 = sup
θb
{θb : g1(θb) = θl} (37)
Lemma 1 requires θ1 > 0 and the equilibrium outcome has been uniquely determined for
all θb < θ1.
20Given that t iterations have been completed and the equilibrium outcome has been uniquely
determined for all θb < θt, I can perform the t + 1 iteration:
The t + 1 Iteration
Given Ct, and Xt; for all θb, let
gt+1(θb) = argmax
θa
((1 − δ)θa + δCt(θa))(F(θb) − F(θa)) + ¯ δXt(θa) (38)
Ct+1(θb) = (1 − δ)gt+1(θb) + δCt (gt+1(θb)) (39)
Xt+1(θb) = Ct+1(θb)(F(θb) − F (gt+1(θb))) + δXt (gt+1(θb)) (40)
Again unless θb = θh, the solution to the above problem is unique. Once this iteration
is complete, I have uniquely described equilibrium behavior for all upper bounds on beliefs
θb ≤ θt+1 where given θt, θt+1 is deﬁned as:
θt+1 = sup
θb
{θb : gt+1(θb) ≤ θt} (41)
Sincethebargaininglastsaﬁnitenumberofperiods, afteratmostT iterations, (gT,CT,XT,)
is the solution to the simpler functional equation for a given value of θh. Since the argument
in Ausubel and Deneckere (1989) does not apply in the initial period, gT may not be single
valued. But the monotonicity of the problem guarantees that gT is single valued except at most
a countable set, which completes the existence and uniqueness results.
Proof of Lemma ??
Consider an upper bound on beliefs θh, that is small enough such that for either n the game
ends in no more than two periods of bargaining. Hence the proposer with such a belief solves:
g1(θb) = argmax
θa
((1 − δ)θa + δθl)(F(θh) − F(θa)) + ¯ δθlF(θa) (42)
Consider an upper bound on beliefs, θN, such that θN equals the supremum of all upper
bounds on beliefs for which gN(θN) = θl when n = N. It follows that:
(1 − δ)(F(θN) − F (θl)) − θlf (θl) = −¯ δNθlf (θl)
where N is an argument in ¯ δN When the F.O.C. is evaluated for n = 1 it becomes,
(1 − δ)(F(θN) − F(θl)) − θlf (θl) > −¯ δ1θlf (θl)
21Hence, for n = 1 the solution to the two period problem is strictly greater than θl. (Though
not shown, this can be seen by examining the F.O.C evaluated at θN instead of θl for n = 1
where the inequality is ﬂipped.)
And, for all θh in a neighborhood of θ1, the lemma holds.
Proof of Proposition 3
To update notation, let X be a function of θh,n and also δ. First I begin with a well known
property of these models which is the basis of the proof.
Property 1. Revenues satisfy Coase Conjecture
Let δ → 1. Then, for any θh, and any bankruptcy system:
X(θh,1,δ) ↓ 0
The proof of the above property is in GSW and is not shown here due to its length.
It is convenient to rewrite the problem to ﬁnd a more manageable measure of welfare. I
prefer to minimize the deadweight or social losses. Hence I deﬁne a new term, SL(θh,n,δ),
which is the lost surplus due to delay for a bankruptcy system with an upper bound of θh and a































I require one more item of notation before I can state the original problem in a form I prefer.
The revenues creditors achieve both inside and outside bankruptcy are R(θh,n,δ) where θh is
the highest type in bankruptcy, n the number of creditors who bargain with the ﬁrm and δ the
discount factor.
R(θh,n,δ) = X(θh,n,δ) + θh (1 − F(θh))
The choice of system that maximizes ex-ante welfare can be found by solving a related
problem. In the UK, for any n the revenues in bankruptcy are identical. Hence what is inde-
terminant is whether I − X(θh,1) is supplied by creditor one or by the other n − 1 creditors.
22Hence without loss of generality, I can assume this ﬁnance is supplied by the receiver. Thus
the problem which deﬁnes ex-ante welfare is identical in the UK system to the US system with
one creditor. Thus ﬁx n as either 1 or N > 1. Consider the following problem with the US
law.
θh,n ∈ {1,N} = argminSL(θh,n,δ) (44)
such that R(θh,n,δ) = I (45)
If N solves the above problem, the US system maximizes welfare. If not welfare is equiv-
alent in the two systems.
Now given this alternative form of the problem, I show that any N > 1 such that the above
problem is well deﬁned solves the problem for δ sufﬁciently high.
To prove the proposition, ﬁx N > 1 and I and pick  arbitrarily small.
Let θh(N,δ) and θh(1,δ) be the values of θh associated with the N and one creditor systems
at I. Note both terms increase in δ. Also choose δ such
θh(N,δ) − θh(1,δ) < 
Such a choice is possible since for high discount factors, the one creditor system produces
arbitrarily small revenues in bankruptcy. Also note that for δ sufﬁciently high, θh(1,δ) is
bounded away from zero. Next I transform the SL function so that it does not converge to zero




Note immediately that SLB is continuous over the relevant range of every variable.
Next I use identity (21) to bound SLB(θh,1,δ) − SLB(θh,N,δ) from below by using the
implied differences in the belief updating function. Note the β which solves equation (21) is
continuous in δ. Let θa = β and write it as a function of N and δ. Take the limit of θa(n,δ) as











M is continuous and converges to ∞. For δ∗ sufﬁciently high this number must be bounded
away from zero.
Also let c ≥ sup
θa(N,δ) √
1−δθa(N,δ)2 which is bounded from above. Also choose c to be ﬁnite.
Consider
SLB (θh(1,δ),1,δ) − SLB (θh(1,δ),N,δ)
which is
≥ M(δ)(θh(1,δ)) − c ∗ (θh(N,δ) − θh(1,δ))
For  sufﬁciently small (δ sufﬁciently close to one), the ﬁrst term is bounded away from
zero, whereas the second term converges to zero. Hence,
23SLB(θh,1,δ) − SLB(θh,N,δ) > 0
which proves the proposition.
9 Appendix C: Brief Detail on Data
The only numbers that are original to my research are the numbers on delays in bankruptcy.
The numbers for US delays are from Bankruptcy DataSource which covers ﬁrms of assets of
more than 50 million dollars. The data comes from a sample of approximately 200 ﬁrms. Firms
that were not successfully reorganized were removed from the sample. The two events from
the which the duration is taken are the ﬁrm’s entrance in to Chapter 11 and the conﬁrmation of
the plan. The later date is very close to the formal conclusion of bankruptcy, but is available
more frequently. All ﬁrms in the sample exited bankruptcy between January 1995 December
2001. The ﬁrms in the sample are attached as Table 1. This number closely tracks what other
authors have found. See in particular, White (1996b) and Altman and Eberhart (1999).
The British data is taken from the ICC Directory of UK Companies. This source consists of
ﬁrms that exited Receivership between August 1997 and November 2003. The relevant events
for the duration number are the ”Appointment of the Receivership” and the ”Notice of Ceasing
to Act as A Receiver or a Manager.” I took a subsample16 of approximately 400 ﬁrms from
the data. Firms that failed to successfully reorganize17 were removed from the sample and the
time between the two events for the remaining ﬁrms is attached as Table 2. A question may be
asked how robust this observation is to other deﬁnitions of delays from the data. Particularly,
under UK law, receivers are required to submit a plan of reorganization to the creditors close
to the initiating of receivership. There is no vote on the plan. Using the submission of a plan to
date the end of uncertainty under receivership would greatly shorten the delays for the UK, but
would also not capture the tenuous nature of such plans, which seldom end a ﬁrm’s receivership
or guarantee the ﬁrm will avoid liquidations. The theory does not predict that reorganizations
which eventually lead to liquidation are faster under the US system. The current management’s
consent to return as a manager is an important element of the theory.
16The randomization device chosen was to select ﬁrms that used the abbreviation Ltd. in their title instead of
the full word Limited.
17I do not consider ﬁrms sold as a going concern to be successfully reorganized. I adopt this convention to be
consistent with the theory in this paper.
24Figure 1: Timelines
25Figure 2: Example 1: No Gap Case
26Figure 3: Example 2: Gap Case
27Figure 4: US Data on Durations
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29